如果回顾 2008 年藏区骚乱和 2021 年 3 月新疆棉花争议之后中国的舆论场，不难发现，不同的民族主义顶峰时刻之间具有惊人的同构性（isomorphism）。

Cable: 08BEIJING1454_a

Party Buoyed by Nationalist Sentiment…

11. (C) Almost all of our contacts believe the Party has been buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment, fueled in part by anger at the West over “biased” media reporting on Tibet and Olympic-related protests. Caijing’s Huang Shan, Global Times’ Wang Wen and Study Times’ Deng Yuwen all emphasized to PolOff that Chinese “anger” over the West’s “bias” on Tibet is real, widespread and will have long-term effects. All three of them seemed themselves to be angry over Western media reporting, refusing to recognize the irony that for most Chinese, their only access to this “biased Western reporting” is through the official PRC press agency Xinhua’s characterization of it. Huang emphasized that virtually “everyone” he knows is angry and believes that Western reporting, together with calls for boycotting the Olympic opening ceremony, implies support for Tibetan independence and makes the public feel that the West is trying to “keep China down.” Southern Daily’s Fang, meanwhile, said nationalism is definitely surging, but he thought this sentiment is largely concentrated in the 25-35-year-old age group among both Hans and Tibetans.

12. (C) Whatever the causes of the surge in nationalism, the result has been a dramatic increase in support for the Party’s policy on Tibet, contacts say. CASS’s Dong Lisheng and Caijing’s Huang said this outcome is partly a “natural” reaction to the fact that Chinese have in recent years become more nationalistic as a result of growing pride over China’s rapid development, with the Tibet furor merely providing the most recent “spark” to inflame passions. Professor Dong and Fang Jinyu separately acknowledged, however, that the Party’s propaganda line has also purposefully stoked nationalistic feelings in order to rally the public in support of the Center’s Tibet policy, and so far, it has been very successful in doing so. The recent Tibet crisis has “completely unified” the people behind the Party and Government, something that had been “unthinkable” throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, Global Times’ Wang Wen asserted.

13. (C) Although support for the Party over Tibet is currently quite high, popular passions also serve to constrain the leadership’s options, CASS’s Dong Lisheng warned. Nationalism remains one “pillar” of Party rule, but central leaders do not want to let these feelings “spin out of control,” Dong said. Perhaps reflecting these concerns, the Propaganda Department earlier this month reportedly directed that attacks on the Western press in China’s official media be curtailed, according to Tsinghua University Professor Zhou Qing’an (strictly protect) and Global Times’ Wang Wen. That has not, however, stopped Chinese bloggers from continuing their attacks via the Internet, Wang observed. Caijing’s Huang also expressed concern about the long-term implications of the surge in nationalism, noting that “nothing is ever completely good.” At any rate, there is “virtually no way” the Center could initiate a change in policy toward Tibet and the Dalai Lama, at least in the short term, given the popular anger over such issues, Huang said.

受到民族主义情绪鼓舞的党……

11. (C) 几乎所有我们的联系人都认为，中国共产党受到高涨的民族主义情绪鼓舞，部分原因是对西方媒体在西藏和奥运相关抗议活动上的“偏见”报道感到愤怒。《财经》杂志的 Huang、《环球时报》的 Wang Wen 和《学习时报》的 Deng Yuwen 都向 PolOff 强调，中国人对西方在西藏问题上的“偏见”的“愤怒”是真实的、广泛的，并将产生长期影响。他们三个人似乎自己都对西方媒体的报道感到愤怒，拒绝承认对大多数中国人来说，他们唯一能接触到这种“有偏见的西方报道”是通过中国官方新闻机构新华社对它的定性，这本身就是一种讽刺。Huang 强调，他所认识的几乎“每个人”都很愤怒，认为西方的报道，加上呼吁抵制奥运开幕式，意味着对藏独的支持，让公众觉得西方在试图“压制中国”。南方日报集团的 Fang 则表示，民族主义肯定在涌动，但他认为这种情绪主要集中在汉族和藏族的 25—35 岁年龄段。

12. (C) 联系人说，无论民族主义激增的原因是什么，其结果是对党的西藏政策的支持率急剧上升。中国社科院的 Dong Lisheng 和《财经》杂志的 Huang 说，这一结果在一定程度上是“自然”的反应，因为近年来中国人对中国的快速发展越来越感到自豪，因此变得更加民族主义，而西藏风波只是提供了最新的“火种”，煽动了人们的激情。不过，Dong 教授和 Fang Jinyu 分别承认，党的宣传路线为了凝聚民众支持中央的西藏政策，也有目的地煽动民族主义情绪，而且到目前为止，这种做法非常成功。《环球时报》的 Wang Wen 断言，最近的西藏危机让人们“完全团结在党和政府的背后”，这在整个上世纪八九十年代的大部分时间里都是“不可想象的”。

……但党也受制于大众的热情

13. (C) 中国社科院的 Dong Lisheng 警告说，虽然目前在西藏问题上对党的支持率相当高，但民众的激情也制约着领导层的选择。 民族主义仍然是党执政的一个“支柱”，但中央领导人不希望让这些情绪“失控”，董立新说。清华大学教授 Zhou Qing’an（严格保护）和《环球时报》Wang Wen 的说法，或许反映了这些担忧：本月早些时候，中宣部据说指示要减少中国官方媒体对西方媒体的攻击。不过，王文观察到，这并没有阻止中国博主继续通过互联网进行攻击。《财经》的 Huang 也对民族主义激增的长期影响表示担忧，他指出，“没有什么事情是完全的好事”。Huang 说，无论如何，鉴于民众对此类问题的愤怒，至少在短期内，中央“几乎没有办法”主动改变对西藏和达赖喇嘛的政策。

不过从 2008 年到 2021 年，党的西藏政策并没有根本性改变，据此推测在中央决策层，并没有对西方机会主义的政策空间。无法主动改变对藏和达赖政策尽管只是短期的约束，但与组织的长期目标正好契合。